Search for: All records

Auditing social-media algorithms has become a focus of public-interest research and policymaking to ensure their fairness across demographic groups such as race, age, and gender in consequential domains such as the presentation of employment opportunities. However, such demographic attributes are often unavailable to auditors and platforms. When demographics data is unavailable, auditors commonly \emph{infer} them from other available information. In this work, we study the effects of inference error on auditing for bias in one prominent application: \emph{black-box} audit of ad delivery using \emph{paired ads}. We show that inference error, if not accounted for, causes auditing to falsely miss skew that exists. We then propose a way to mitigate the inference error when evaluating skew in ad delivery algorithms. Our method works by adjusting for expected error due to demographic inference, and it makes skew detection more sensitive when attributes must be inferred. Because inference is increasingly used for auditing, our results provide an important addition to the auditing toolbox to promote correct audits of ad delivery algorithms for bias. While the impact of attribute inference on accuracy has been studied in other domains, our work is the first to consider it for black-box evaluation of ad delivery bias, when only aggregate data is available to the auditor. 

The 2022 settlement between Meta and the U.S. Department of Justice to resolve allegations of discriminatory advertising resulted is a first-of-its-kind change to Meta's ad delivery system aimed to address algorithmic discrimination in its housing ad delivery. In this work, we explore direct and indirect effects of both the settlement's choice of terms and the Variance Reduction System (VRS) implemented by Meta on the actual reduction in discrimination. \newline We first show that the settlement terms allow for an implementation that does not meaningfully improve access to opportunities for individuals. The settlement measures impact of ad delivery in terms of impressions, instead of unique individuals reached by an ad; it allows the platform to level down access, reducing disparities by decreasing the overall access to opportunities; and it allows the platform to selectively apply VRS to only small advertisers. \newline We then conduct experiments to evaluate VRS with real-world ads, and show that while VRS does reduce variance, it also raises advertiser costs (measured per-individuals-reached), therefore decreasing user exposure to opportunity ads for a given ad budget. VRS thus \emph{passes the cost of decreasing variance to advertisers}. \newline Finally, we explore an alternative approach to achieve the settlement goals, that is significantly more intuitive and transparent than VRS. We show our approach outperforms VRS by both increasing ad exposure for users from \emph{all} groups and reducing cost to advertisers, thus demonstrating that the increase in cost to advertisers when implementing the settlement is not inevitable. \newline Our methodologies use a black-box approach that relies on capabilities available to any regular advertiser, rather than on privileged access to data, allowing others to reproduce or extend our work. 

We consider the setting where a user with sensitive features wishes to obtain a recommendation from a server in a differentially private fashion. We propose a "multi-selection" architecture where the server can send back multiple recommendations and the user chooses one from these that matches best with their private features. When the user feature is one-dimensional - on an infinite line - and the accuracy measure is defined w.r.t some increasing function 𝔥(.) of the distance on the line, we precisely characterize the optimal mechanism that satisfies differential privacy. The specification of the optimal mechanism includes both the distribution of the noise that the user adds to its private value, and the algorithm used by the server to determine the set of results to send back as a response. We show that Laplace is an optimal noise distribution in this setting. Furthermore, we show that this optimal mechanism results in an error that is inversely proportional to the number of results returned when the function 𝔥(.) is the identity function. 

Recently, Meta has shifted towards AI-mediated ad targeting mechanisms that do not require advertisers to provide detailed targeting criteria. The shift is likely driven by excitement over AI capabilities as well as the need to address new data privacy policies and targeting changes agreed upon in civil rights settlements. At the same time, in response to growing public concern about the harms of targeted advertising, Meta has touted their ad preference controls as an effective mechanism for users to exert control over the advertising they see. Furthermore, Meta markets their Why this ad targeting explanation as a transparency tool that allows users to understand the reasons for seeing particular ads and inform their actions to control what ads they see in the future. Our study evaluates the effectiveness of Meta's See less ad control, as well as the actionability of ad targeting explanations following the shift to AI-mediated targeting. We conduct a large-scale study, randomly assigning participants the intervention of marking See less to either Body Weight Control or Parenting topics, and collecting the ads Meta shows to participants and their targeting explanations before and after the intervention. We find that utilizing the See less ad control for the topics we study does not significantly reduce the number of ads shown by Meta on these topics, and that the control is less effective for some users whose demographics are correlated with the topic. Furthermore, we find that the majority of ad targeting explanations for local ads made no reference to location-specific targeting criteria, and did not inform users why ads related to the topics they requested to See less of continued to be delivered. We hypothesize that the poor effectiveness of controls and lack of actionability and comprehensiveness in explanations are the result of the shift to AI-mediated targeting, for which explainability and transparency tools have not yet been developed by Meta. Our work thus provides evidence for the need of new methods for transparency and user control, suitable and reflective of how the increasingly complex and AI-mediated ad delivery systems operate. 

Detailed targeting of advertisements has long been one of the core offerings of online platforms. Unfortunately, malicious advertisers have frequently abused such targeting features, with results that range from violating civil rights laws to driving division, polarization, and even social unrest. Platforms have often attempted to mitigate this behavior by removing targeting attributes deemed problematic, such as inferred political leaning, religion, or ethnicity. In this work, we examine the effectiveness of these mitigations by collecting data from political ads placed on Facebook in the lead up to the 2022 U.S. midterm elections. We show that major political advertisers circumvented these mitigations by targeting proxy attributes: seemingly innocuous targeting criteria that closely correspond to political and racial divides in American society. We introduce novel methods for directly measuring the skew of various targeting criteria to quantify their effectiveness as proxies, and then examine the scale at which those attributes are used. Our findings have crucial implications for the ongoing discussion on the regulation of political advertising and emphasize the urgency for increased transparency. 

We consider the setting where a user with sensitive features wishes to obtain a recommendation from a server in a differentially private fashion. We propose a ``multi-selection'' architecture where the server can send back multiple recommendations and the user chooses one from these that matches best with their private features. When the user feature is one-dimensional -- on an infinite line -- and the accuracy measure is defined w.r.t some increasing function 𝔥(.) of the distance on the line, we precisely characterize the optimal mechanism that satisfies differential privacy. The specification of the optimal mechanism includes both the distribution of the noise that the user adds to its private value, and the algorithm used by the server to determine the set of results to send back as a response and further show that Laplace is an optimal noise distribution. We further show that this optimal mechanism results in an error that is inversely proportional to the number of results returned when the function 𝔥(.) is the identity function. 

Rankings are ubiquitous across many applications, from search engines to hiring committees. In practice, many rankings are derived from the output of predictors. However, when predictors trained for classification tasks have intrinsic uncertainty, it is not obvious how this uncertainty should be represented in the derived rankings. Our work considers ranking functions: maps from individual predictions for a classification task to distributions over rankings. We focus on two aspects of ranking functions: stability to perturbations in predictions and fairness towards both individuals and subgroups. Not only is stability an important requirement for its own sake, but — as we show — it composes harmoniously with individual fairness in the sense of Dwork et al. (2012). While deterministic ranking functions cannot be stable aside from trivial scenarios, we show that the recently proposed uncertainty aware (UA) ranking functions of Singh et al. (2021) are stable. Our main result is that UA rankings also achieve group fairness through successful composition with multiaccurate or multicalibrated predictors. Our work demonstrates that UA rankings naturally interpolate between group and individual level fairness guarantees, while simultaneously satisfying stability guarantees important whenever machine-learned predictions are used.